Revising Nonmonotonic Belief Sets: The Case of Defeasible Logic by Billington, David et al.
Revising Nonmonotonic Theories: The Case of
Defeasible Logic
D. Billington, G. Antoniou, G. Governatori, and M. Maher
School of Computing and Information Technology
Griffith University, QLD 4111, Australia
{db,ga,guido,mjm}@cit.gu.edu.au
Abstract. The revision and transformation of knowledge is widely recog-
nized as a key issue in knowledge representation and reasoning. Reasons
for the importance of this topic are the fact that intelligent systems are
gradually developed and refined, and that often the environment of an
intelligent system is not static but changes over time. Traditionally belief
revision has been concerned with revising first order theories.
Nonmonotonic reasoning provides rigorous techniques for reasoning with
incomplete information. Until recently the dynamics of nonmonotonic
reasoning approaches has attracted little attention. This paper studies
the dynamics of defeasible logic, a simple and efficient form of non-
monotonic reasoning based on defeasible rules and priorities. We define
revision and contraction operators and propose postulates. Our postu-
lates try to follow the ideas of AGM belief revision as far as possible,
but some AGM postulates clearly contradict the nonmonotonic nature
of defeasible logic, as we explain. Finally we verify that the operators
satisfy the postulates.
1 Introduction
The revision and transformation of knowledge is widely recognized as a key
problem in knowledge representation and reasoning. Reasons for the importance
of this topic are the fact that intelligent systems are gradually developed and
refined, and that often the environment of an intelligent system is not static but
changes over time.
Belief revision [1,7] studies reasoning with changing information. Tradition-
ally belief revision techniques have been concerned with the revision of knowl-
edge expressed in classical logic. The approach taken is to study postulates for
operators, the most well-known operators being revision and contraction.
Until recently little attention was devoted to the revision of more complex
kinds of knowledge. But in the past few years there has been an increasing
amount of work on revising nonmonotonic knowledge, in particular default logic
theories [17,9,18]. These works were motivated by the ability of default reasoning
to maintain inconsistent knowledge, and the use of default reasoning in various
application domains. For example, the use of default rules has been proposed
for the maintenance of software [5,14]. In requirements engineering the use of
W. Burgard, T. Christaller and A.B. Cremers (eds)
KI-99: Advances in Artificial Intelligence.
LNCS 1701, pp. 101–112, 1999.
c© Springer 1999. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
102 D. Billington, G. Antoniou, G. Governatori, and M. Maher
default rules has been proposed [2,19] to identify and trace inconsistencies among
single requirements. One key issue in requirements engineering is the evolution
of requirements, which technically translates to the evolution of default theories.
Default logics are known to be computationally complex [10,12]. In this paper
we will study a simple, efficient default reasoning approach, defeasible logic [16].
It is a sceptical reasoning approach based on the use of defeasible rules and
priorities between them. Its usefulness has been demonstrated in several domains
[3,6].
In studying the revision of knowledge in defeasible logic, first we formulate
postulates for revision and contraction operators in defeasible logic. We chose
to be guided by the AGM postulates for classical belief revision [1]. Some of the
AGM postulates can be readily adopted. Others need to be slightly modified, but
we can demonstrate a close link to the motivation of the postulate as expressed,
say, by Gardenfors [7]. But some AGM postulates contradict the nonmonotonic
nature of defeasible logic. This contradiction is not surprising since AGM belief
revision was designed for the revision of (monotonic) classical logical theories.
Once we establish the postulates we define concrete revision and contraction
operators for defeasible logic, and show that they satisfy the proposed postulates.
2 Defeasible Logic
In this paper we use a simplified version of defeasible logic, in that strict rules are
not considered; for the description of the full logic see [15]. We also consider only
an essentially propositional version of the logic: the language does not contain
function symbols and every expression with variables represents the finite set of
its variable-free instances. A knowledge base consists of facts, rules (defeasible
rules and defeaters), and a superiority relation among rules.
Facts denote simple pieces of information that are deemed to be true regard-
less of other knowledge items. Thus, facts are not revisable. A typical fact is that
Tweety is a bird: bird(tweety).
There are two kinds of rules, defeasible rules and defeaters. A rule r consists
of its antecedent A(r) (written on the left) which is a finite set of literals, an
arrow, and its consequent C(r) which is a literal. In examples we will often omit
set notation for A(r).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An
example of such a rule is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ flies(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that
it flies, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it may not fly. Defeasible
rules with an empty antecedent are a little like facts, but they are defeatable
and revisable.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only
use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some
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defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an
animal is heavy then it may not be able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X); ¬flies(X)
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence that the animal
may not be able to fly. In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬flies(X) if
heavy(X), we simply want to prevent a conclusion flies(X).
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules,
that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example,
given the defeasible rules
r : republican⇒ ¬pacifist
r′ : quaker ⇒ pacifist
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about the
pacifism of a person who is both a republican and a quaker. But if we introduce
a superiority relation > with r > r′, then we can indeed conclude ¬pacifist.
A defeasible theory T is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite consistent set of
literals (called facts), R a finite set of rules, and > an acyclic superiority relation
on R. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with head q, and Rd[q] denotes the set
of defeasible rules in R with head q
A conclusion of T is a tagged literal and can have one of the following three
forms: (i) +∂q, which means that q is defeasibly provable in T ; (ii) −∂q, which
means that we have proved that q is not defeasible provable in T ; and (iii) Σq,
which means that there is a reasoning chain supporting q.
Provability is defined below. It is based on the concept of a proof in T =
(F,R,>). A proof or derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of tagged
literals satisfying the following conditions (P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the
sequence P of length i, and ∼ p the complement of a literal p):
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) ∼ q 6∈ F and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼ q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rd[q]
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
t > s
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) q 6∈ F and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) ∼ q ∈ F or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼ q] such that
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(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
not t > s
Σq: If P (i+ 1) = Σq then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : Σa ∈ P (1..i)
The elements of a proof are called lines of the proof. We say that a tagged literal
L is provable in T = (F,R,>), denoted T ` L, iff there is a proof P in T such
that L is a line of P . We say that literal q is provable in T iff T ` +∂q, and that
q is supported in T iff T ` Σq.
Even though the definition seems complicated, it follows ideas which are
intuitively appealing. For example, the condition +∂ states the following: One
way of establishing that q is defeasibly provable is to show that it is a fact.
The other way is to find a rule with conclusion q, all antecedents of which are
defeasibly provable. In addition, it must be established that ∼q is not a fact (to
do otherwise would be counterintuitive – to derive q defeasibly, although there
might be a definite reason against it), and for every rule s which might provide
evidence for ∼q, either one of its antecedents is provably not derivable, or there
is a rule with conclusion q which is stronger than s and can be applied (that is,
all its antecedents are defeasibly provable). Essentially the defeasible rules with
head q form a team which tries to counterattack any rule with head ∼ q. If the
rules for q win then q is derived defeasibly; otherwise q cannot be derived in this
manner.
Support means simple forward chaining reasoning without considering coun-
terarguments.
Finally let T = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, M a set of literals and
X =M ∪{∼p | p ∈M}. We define T	M = (F,R−R[X], >′), where R[X] denotes
the set of rules in R with head a literal in X, and >′ is the reduct of > on
R−R[X].
3 Postulates for Belief Change Operators
In this section we will formulate reasonable postulates for belief revision oper-
ators in a defeasible reasoning framework. We will be considering the classical
AGM postulates and will be proposing necessary modifications.
3.1 Belief Bases and Belief Sets
First we need to specify the kinds of belief sets we will consider. In classical
logic, a belief set is supposed to be a deductively closed set of formulas. In
our framework it is natural to study sets of conclusions from a given defeasible
theory T . We note that in the defeasible logic variant we are studying here the
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conclusions are single literals. But we can easily reason with a somewhat more
general set of conclusions: conjunctions of literals. Other types of conclusions can
also be treated but we would need more complex technical means, so we defer
their discussions to later papers. Technically we will consider a conjunction of
literals p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn to be a conclusion of T iff T ` +∂pi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
A set of literals BB is a belief base iff there is a defeasible theory T such that
BB = {p | T ` +∂p}. Equivalently, a belief base is any finite consistent set of
literals. We say that BB is generated by T .
Now we define the belief set B(T ) generated by the defeasible theory T to
be the conjunctive closure of the corresponding belief base. That is, a set of
conjunctions of literals B is a belief set iff there is a defeasible theory T such
that B = {p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn | T ` +∂p1, . . . , T ` +∂pn}.
In the following we assume that T = (F,R,>) is a defeasible theory, BB the
belief base generated by T , and B(T ) the belief set generated by T . ΣT denotes
the set of beliefs supported by T . Finally pi and qj denote literals, and c, ck
denote conjunctions of literals.
3.2 The Change Operators
As in classical belief revision, we will distinguish between three kinds of belief
changes:
(i) expansion +, which seeks to add a new formula ϕ to the belief set B if
the negation of ϕ is not included in B. This is the original motivation of
expansion as explained by Gardenfors in [7].
(ii) revision ∗, which adds a formula ϕ to the belief set B even in cases where
the negation of ϕ is in B. To achieve this outcome the operation may need
to delete formulas in B.
(iii) contraction −, which seeks to retract a sentence ϕ without adding new con-
clusions.
In practice, revision and contraction have attracted the greatest attention.
Therefore we will not be addressing postulates for expansion.
In accordance with the defeasible logic we are studying in this paper, the
sentences ϕ will be either literals or conjunctions of literals. In future work we
will study change with full propositional formulas in variants of defeasible logic
allowing for disjunction.
3.3 Postulates for Revision
The first postulate in classical belief revision states that B∗p is closed under
logical consequences. According to the discussion in section 3.1, its counterpart
is the following which, under our definitions, holds trivially:
(∗1) B(T ∗c ) is a belief set.
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The second AGM postulate in classical belief revision guarantees that the sen-
tence ϕ is added to the belief set. Basically we adopt the same idea, with one
difference: we forbid the addition of a contradiction to the belief base. There are
two kinds of contradictions. The obvious one is to have a complementary pair of
literals in the conjunction. For the other kind of contradiction we note that we
consider facts in a defeasible theory to be undisputed information. Thus if we
attempt to add a literal pi but ∼ pi is a fact, then the addition of pi is rejected,
as is the addition of any conjunction of literals that contains pi.
(∗2) If ∼ pi 6∈ F and pi 6=∼ pj (for all i, j) then p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ∈ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn).
According to Gardenfors [7], the aim of the third and fourth AGM postulates is
to identify revision with expansion in case the negation of the sentence ϕ to be
added is not in B. The next two postulates achieve the same for defeasible logic.
(The use of two postulates by [1] is for technical reasons [7], which do not seem
to hold for defeasible logic. We use two postulates only to be consistent with the
AGM numbering.)
(∗3) If ∼ p1, . . . ,∼ pn 6∈ B(T ) then B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn) ⊆ B(T+p1∧...∧pn).
(∗4) If ∼ p1, . . . ,∼ pn 6∈ B(T ) then B(T+p1∧...∧pn) ⊆ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn).
The fifth AGM postulate states that the result of a revision by ϕ is the absurd
belief set iff ¬ϕ is logically valid. Since, by definition, there is no absurd belief
set in defeasible logic (due to its sceptical nature, p and ∼ p cannot be proven
together), establishing an exact counterpart to the fifth AGM postulate is not
straightforward. We note, though, that in AGM postulates 2 and 5 are related:
it is postulate 2 which admits a contradiction and creates the possibility of an
absurd belief set, as specified in postulate 5. In our case we mentioned already
that the addition of a contradictory sentence should be rejected. The types of
contradiction were discussed before the definition of (∗2). As in AGM, our fifth
postulate defines the behaviour of revision in case we try to add a contradictory
formula.
(∗5) If ∼ pi ∈ F or ∼ pi = pj (for some i, j) then p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn 6∈ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn).
In fact this postulate can be strengthened by providing more information on
what happens if addition of a contradictory formula is rejected. We formulate
two variations. (∗5a) states that in case p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn is self-contradictory, or at
least one ∼ pi ∈ F , then revision by p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn should not cause any change.
Note that in case ∼ pi ∈ F for some i, the entire conjunction contradicts the
facts.
Condition (∗5b) is weaker in that all p1, . . . , pn are required to contradict F
for the revision of p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn to have no effect.
(∗5a) If ∼ pi ∈ F or ∼ pi = pj (for some i, j) then B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn) = B(T ).
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(∗5b) If ∼ pi ∈ F (for all i) or ∼ pi = pj (for some i, j) then B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn) = B(T ).
The sixth AGM postulate expresses syntax-independence, and has a natural
counterpart in defeasible logic.
(∗6) If the set of literals in the conjunctions c1 and c2 is the same, then B(T ∗c1) =
B(T ∗c2).
This concludes the adaptation of the basic AGM postulates. Now we consider
the composite postulates, the seventh and eighth, which regard the conjunction
of sentences. According to [7] by the principle of minimal change revision with
both ϕ and ψ ought to be the same as the expansion of B(T ∗ϕ) by ψ, provided
that ψ does not contradict the beliefs in B(T ∗ϕ). Again for technical reasons, two
AGM postulates were formulated. Below we state two postulates for defeasible
logic revision to maintain the correspondence to the AGM postulates for classical
belief revision.
(∗7) If ∼ q1, . . . ,∼ qm 6∈ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn) then
B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn∧q1∧...∧qm) ⊆ B((T ∗p1∧...∧pn)+q1∧...∧qm).
(∗8) If ∼ q1, . . . ,∼ qm 6∈ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn) then
B((T ∗p1∧...∧pn)
+
q1∧...∧qm) ⊆ B(T ∗p1∧...∧pn∧q1∧...∧qm).
3.4 Postulates for Contraction
The first postulate we formulate is a natural adaptation of the first AGM pos-
tulate.
(−1) B(T−c ) is a belief set.
The second AGM postulate states that we contract a formula only by deleting
some formulas, but not by adding new ones. This postulate cannot be adopted
in our framework because it contradicts the sceptical nonmonotonic nature of
defeasible logic. To see this, suppose that we know a, and we have rules ⇒ p
and a ⇒ ¬p. Then a is sceptically provable and p is not. But if we decide to
contract a then p becomes sceptically provable. We note that this behaviour
is not confined to the specifics of defeasible logic but holds in any sceptical
nonmonotonic formalism (e.g. in the sceptical interpretation of default logic).
But this example also suggests what proportion of the original idea of the
second AGM postulate we can maintain: even though p was not in the original
belief set, its appearance in the result of the contraction is not due to the addition
of new rules. Stated differently, even though p was not provable in the original
nonmonotonic knowledge base, it was nevertheless supported.
(−2) B(T−c ) ⊆ ΣT .
The principle of minimal change requires that if the sentence to be retracted is
not included in the belief set, no change is necessary.
108 D. Billington, G. Antoniou, G. Governatori, and M. Maher
(−3) If c 6∈ B(T ) then B(T−c ) = B(T ).
The fourth AGM postulate states that the sentence to be retracted is not in-
cluded in the outcome of the contraction operation, unless it is a tautology. In
our framework this situation cannot arise since a conjunction of literals is never
a tautology. But if we follow our earlier idea that the negations of facts are con-
tradictions (thus facts may be viewed as being always true), it is natural to state
the following:
(−4) If p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ∈ B(T−p1∧...∧pn) then p1, . . . , pn ∈ F .
The fifth AGM postulate expresses the possibility of recovery: if we retract a
sentence and then add it again, then we do not lose any of the original beliefs.
This idea is naturally expressed in defeasible logic below.
The condition c ∈ B(T ) is necessary: in case c 6∈ B(T ), the addition of c
may remove a literal ∼ pi which contradicts a conjunct pi in c. Due to the
nonmonotonic nature of defeasible logic, this may cause the removal of further
literals from B(T ). Thus without the condition c ∈ B(T ) the postulate cannot
be reasonably expected to hold.
(−5) If c ∈ B(T ) then B(T ) ⊆ B((T−c )+c ).
Syntax independence is again straightforward.
(−6) If the set of literals in the conjunctions c1 and c2 is the same, then B(T−c1) =
B(T−c2).
The seventh and eighth AGM postulates are simply adopted.
(−7) B(T−c1) ∩B(T−c2) ⊆ B(T−c1∧c2)
(−8) If c1 6∈ B(T−c1∧c2) then B(T−c1∧c2) ⊆ B(T−c1)
4 Revising Defeasible Theories
Having formulated postulates for change operators motivated by the original
AGM postulates, the question remains what concrete operators might satisfy
these sets of postulates, indeed whether such operators exist. In the following we
define such concrete operators and prove that indeed they satisfy our postulates.
We will use a common notation for all operators. Let c = p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn be the
formula to be added/deleted.
4.1 Expansion
Gardenfors [7] states that expansion is meant to add a formula ϕ to B(T ) only
if ¬ϕ 6∈ B(T ). In this sense, the case where ¬ϕ ∈ B(T ) is irrelevant. However
AGM decided to also add ϕ in this case. We will keep T unchanged, following
[7] rather than [1].
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T+c =
T if ∼ pi ∈ B(T ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}T if ∼ pi = pj for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}(F,R′, >′) otherwise
where
R′ = R ∪ {⇒ p1, . . . ,⇒ pn}
>′ = (> ∪ {⇒ pi > r | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r ∈ R[∼ pi]})−
{r > ⇒ pi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r ∈ R[∼ pi]}.
Thus we add rules that prove each of the literals pi, and ensure that these are
strictly stronger than any possibly contradicting rules.
4.2 Revision
AGM revision works in the same way as AGM expansion when the formula to
be added does not cause an inconsistency, but revision adds a formula even if




T if p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ∈ B(T )
(F,R′, >′) otherwise
where
R′ = R ∪ {⇒ p1, . . . ,⇒ pn}
>′= (> ∪ {⇒ pi > r | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r ∈ R[∼ pi]})−
{r > ⇒ pi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r ∈ R[∼ pi]}.
The difference to our previous definition of + is that now we make the mod-
ifications to the rules and the superiority relation even if the negation of one of
the pi was in B. Note that due to the sceptical nature of defeasible logic, we
still do not get a contradiction (in the sense of being able to prove both pi and
∼ pi. Theorem 1 below (equivalently, the postulates (∗1)− (∗8)) specifies when
we will be able to prove pi and when ∼ pi.
4.3 Contraction
We define a concrete contraction operator as follows.
T−c =
{
T if p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn 6∈ B(T )
(F,R′, >′) otherwise
where
R′ = R ∪ {p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn ; ∼ pi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
>′ = > − {s > r | r ∈ R′ −R}.
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Intuitively we wish to prevent the proof of p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn, that is, the proof
of all the pi. We achieve this by ensuring that at least one of the pi will not be
proven. The new rules in R′ ensure that if all but one pi have been proven, a
defeater with head ∼ pj will fire. Having made the defeaters not weaker than
any other rules, the defeater cannot be “counterattacked” by another rule, and
pj will not be proven, as an inspection of the condition +∂ in section 2 shows.
4.4 Results
Here we formulate some results on the revision concepts introduced in this paper.
The main theme is to investigate which of the stated postulates are satisfied by
the concrete change operations.
Neither of the two composite contraction AGM postulates (7 and 8) trans-
late naturally into our framework, because they contradict the sceptical non-
monotonic nature of our underlying logical machinery. For example, the seventh
AGM postulate would suggest B(T−p )∩B(T−q ) ⊆ B(T−p∧q). Now consider a non-
monotonic knowledge base with defeasible rules ⇒ p, ⇒ q, p ⇒ a and q ⇒ a.
Then a is provable in both B(T−p ) and B(T
−
q ), but not in B(T
−
p∧q). As for the
eighth AGM postulate, it is motivated by the idea that if we need to remove
more (say p and p ∧ q), then we will get a smaller belief set than just removing
p. But already in our discussion of (−2) we saw that a similar property cannot
be reasonably expected in our framework.
In our postulates we maintain the following idea of the last two AGM postu-
lates: we try to express an upper and a lower bound for a composite contraction
operation. For the lower bound we expect that B(T−p∧q) contains at least the
conclusions that can be proven if we remove from the underlying defeasible the-
ory all rules with head p,∼ p, q, or ∼ q. For the upper bound we use the same
idea as for (−2), that is, by contracting more information we may not add beliefs
that are not supported in the result of contracting less.
(−7a) B(T	{p1,...,pn,q1,...,qm}) ⊆ B(T
−
p1∧...∧pn∧q1∧...∧qm).
(−8a) If p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn 6∈ B(T−p1∧...∧pn∧q1∧...∧qm) then B(T−p1∧...∧pn∧q1∧...∧qm) ⊆
ΣT−p1∧...∧pn .
The following result connects the concrete change operators defined above to
the postulates established in the previous section.
Theorem 1. Let +,∗ and − be the concrete change operators defined in the
previous subsections. Then
– Postulates (∗1)−(∗8) are satisfied. Moreover, (∗5b) is satisfied but not (∗5a).
– Postulates (−1)− (−6) are satisfied. Postulates (−7) and (−8) are not sat-
isfied, but (−7a) and (−8a) are satisfied.
The proof can be found in the full version of this paper.
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The Levi and Harper Identities [13,11] have been proposed as ways to define
revision and contraction in terms of the other two operators. These identities
are consistent with the AGM postulates for classical belief revision. The Levi
Identity holds for our concrete operators.
Theorem 2. Let +,∗ and − be the change operators defined above. Then the
following is true:




p ). Levi Identity
On the other hand, the counterpart of the Harper Identity does not hold, nor
can it be reasonably expected:
B(T−p ) = B(T ) ∩B(T ∗∼p). Harper Identity
As we have already seen in the discussion of (−2), B(T−p ) cannot be expected
to be a subset of B(T ), but clearly the right hand side of the Harper Identity is
a subset of B(T ).
Note that we are only able to formulate these identities for literals. For more
complex formulas we need to incorporate disjunction in the belief sets and the
deductive machinery of defeasible logic (to be able to express the negation of a
conjunction).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the revision of knowledge in defeasible logic. In partic-
ular, we formulated desirable postulates for revision and contraction operators.
In some cases we followed the intuition and formalization of the original AGM
postulates. In other cases we explained why certain AGM postulates are inap-
propriate because they contradict the nonmonotonic nature of defeasible logic,
and proposed reasonable alternatives.
To our knowledge this is the first complete set of postulates for the revision of
explicit nonmonotonic knowledge (of course we are aware of the close relationship
between belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning [8], as well as work showing
that belief revision can be achieved using default reasoning [4]).
Then we defined concrete revision and contraction operators, and showed
that they fulfill the postulates, as well as adaptations of the Levi Identity.
Our future work in the area will include the study of revision in defeasible
logics with disjunction, and the examination of the relevance of revision to the
evolution of knowledge in particular application domains.
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